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An Empirical Assessment of Homicide and Suicide
Outcomes with Red Flag Laws
Rachel Dalafave*
This Article empirically illustrates that red flag laws—laws which permit
removal of firearms from a person who presents a risk to themselves or
others—contribute to a statistically significant decrease in suicide rates, but
do not influence homicide rates. I exploit state-level variation across time in
the existence of red flag laws between 1990 and 2018 and find that the
existence of a risk-based law reduces firearm-related suicides by 6.4% and
overall suicides by 3.7%, with no substitution to non-firearm suicides. Red
flag laws are not associated with a statistically significant change in
homicides rates. Policymakers should consider red flag laws an effective tool
to prevent firearm-related suicide, one of the most prevalent preventable
causes of death in the United States. In light of this evidence, red flag laws
should be more politically successful in the current partisan environment
than other forms of gun control legislation because of their targeted nature
and potential to balance the interests of gun owners against the negative
externalities of gun violence.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, mass shootings have become an almost
daily occurrence in the United States.1 Their frequency has animated the
long-standing, highly polarized debate about the optimal level of gun
control legislation in the United States.2 Despite their increasing
prominence, however, mass shootings are far from the greatest
contributors to the social cost of gun violence. That distinction belongs
to firearm suicide, followed by firearm homicide. On average, from 1990
to 2018, firearm-related suicides killed about 19,000 people per year, and
firearm-related homicides killed an additional 13,200.3 To put this in
1. The Gun Violence Archive defines a mass shooting as a shooting in which four or more
people, excluding the shooter, are shot or killed. Methodology, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE,
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/methodology (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). By this measure, an
average of 378 people died in 334 mass shootings per year from 2013 through 2019 (inclusive), or
1.0 people in 0.92 shootings per day. See, e.g., Mass Shootings, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE,
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/mass-shooting (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (tracking unique
mass shooting events through 2021 and providing the raw data with which to calculate the averages)
(data and calculations on file with author). To access the data by year, see Past Summary Ledgers,
GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Feb. 21,
2021) and click on “Mass Shootings” for each year listed. For the 2013 figures, please see Mass
Shootings in 2013, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/massshootings/2013 (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
2. One study has estimated that it would take approximately 125 people dying in individual gun
homicide incidents to have the same impact on gun bills introduced as each person who dies in a
mass shooting. Michael Luca, Deepak Malhotra & Christopher Poliquin, The Impact of Mass
Shootings on Gun Policy, 181 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 6 (2019). See id. at 10 (“Mass shootings account
for a small fraction of gun deaths in the United States but have a significant impact on gun policy.
More gun laws are proposed in the year following a mass shooting. Furthermore, mass shootings
seem to have much larger effects on policy, per fatality, than do ordinary gun homicides.”).
However, the policy responses differ based on political party. Republican-controlled legislatures
are more likely to loosen gun laws in the year after a mass shooting, while Democrat-controlled
legislatures tend toward stricter laws, however this is statistically insignificant. Id.; see also Hasin
Yousaf, Sticking to One’s Guns: Mass Shootings and the Political Economy of Gun Control in the
U.S.
4
(Dep’t
of
Econ.,
Universidad
Carlos
III
de
Madrid,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3360831
[https://perma.cc/TNR5-F325]
(finding that after a mass shooting, Republican voters prefer less gun control while Democrat voters
prefer more gun control).
3. I calculated these averages using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Underlying Cause of Death records. To calculate the average firearm-related suicides and
homicides per year go to, Compressed Mortality File 1979–1998 on CDC WONDER Online
Database, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D16 [https://perma.cc/3NFF-5EMQ] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2020) [hereinafter CDC WONDER 1979–1998] (Change years from “all” to 1990–98;
change cause of death to “Injury Intent and Mechanism” and select “Suicide” and “Homicide” for
“Injury Intent” and “Firearm” for “Injury Mechanism & All Other Leading Causes”; press send to
get 164,944 suicide deaths and 141,870 homicide deaths during this date range.) and Underlying
Cause of Death 1999-2019 on CDC WONDER Online Database, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT.,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D76
[https://perma.cc/W9K7-67WV] (last visited Mar. 15, 2020) [hereinafter CDC WONDER 1999–
2019] (Change years to 1999–2018; change cause of death to “Injury Intent and Mechanism” and
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perspective, this death toll is the equivalent of over eleven September 11,
2001 attacks every year.4 From 2006 to 2018, firearm-related suicide
rates increased by more than twenty-five percent.5 Reducing this
common source of violent, firearm-related deaths is an important public
policy goal and an important task for researchers. As of the writing of this
Article, suicide prevention is as pressing now as ever because physical
distancing—the primary public health intervention to limit the spread of
COVID-19—also has the potential to worsen social isolation, a known
suicide risk factor.6 Evaluating the best ways to reduce firearm access
among high-risk persons is therefore critical.7
select “Suicide” and “Homicide” for “Injury Intent” and “Firearm” for “Injury Mechanism & All
Other Leading Causes”; press send to get 384,865 suicide deaths and 241,675 homicide deaths
during this date range.), then add the number of deaths together (164,944 + 384,865 for suicides;
141,870 + 241,675 for homicides) and divide this by the number of years (29) to get the average
by year (approximately 19,000 suicides; 13,200 homicides). By contrast, only about 378 people per
year are killed in mass shootings. See supra note 1 (calculating this figure based off figures
provided by the GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE).
4. In total, 2,977 people died in the 9/11 attacks, excluding the 19 hijackers. September 11,
Attacks, HISTORY (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/9-11-attacks
[https://perma.cc/7Y4S-FWU7]; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. (Aug. 21, 2004),
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm [https://perma.cc/U2Z7-8RMR].
5. Rebekah Mannix, Lois Lee & Eric Fleegler, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) and
Firearms in the United States: Will an Epidemic of Suicide Follow?, ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.acpjournals.org/doi/10.7326/M20-1678 [https://perma.cc/MQ47DV2P]; CDC Wonder 1979-1998, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Mannix et al., supra note 5 (discussing the possibility that COVID-19 may
exacerbate the firearm-related suicide crisis); Ann John et al., Trends in Suicide During the COVID19 Pandemic, BRIT. MED. J. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/371/bmj.m4352
[https://perma.cc/G5XG-2HCV] (reviewing preliminary data on suicide during the pandemic);
Sharath Chandra Guntuku et al., Tracking Mental Health and Symptom Mentions on Twitter During
COVID-19, 1 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1, 1 (2020) (comparing mental health estimates from Twitter
across all states and finding that they were significantly lower in 2020 as compared to 2019).
Unemployment and other financial stressors are other suicide risk factors that may be exacerbated
by the pandemic. David Gunnell et al., Suicide Risk and Prevention During the COVID-19
Pandemic, 7 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 468, 469 (2020). There is also some evidence that suicide deaths
increased during past public health emergencies. See Ira M. Wasserman, The Impact of Epidemic,
War, Prohibition and Media on Suicide: United States, 1910-1920, 22 SUICIDE & LIFETHREATENING BEHAV. 240, 251 (1992) (finding that suicides in the Unites States increased during
the 1918–19 influenza pandemic); Y.T. Cheung, P.H. Chau, & Paul S.F. Yip, A Revisit on Older
Adults Suicides and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Epidemic in Hong Kong, 23 INT’L
J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 1231, 1237 (2008) (finding an increase in suicides among older people
in Hong Kong during the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic and concluding that
maintaining the mental wellbeing of the public is critical during public health crises).
7. The eventual effects, if any, of social disruption on mental health may occur with a delay.
For example, after the nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan, the
government evacuated hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom had to stay away from the
area for months or years. Suicide rates initially decreased but increased about two years after the
disaster. Masatsugu Orui et al., Suicide Rates in Evacuation Areas After the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Disaster: A 5-year Follow-up Study in Fukushima Prefecture, 39 CRISIS 353, 360 (2018)
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Red flag laws are one potential tool to curb gun violence. Red flag laws
are risk-based firearm seizure laws that permit police or family members
to petition a state court to order the temporary removal of firearms from
a person who may present a danger to themselves8 or others.9 Although
a large body of research examines the impact of gun control policies on
gun-related violence,10 red flag laws have received much less attention
from researchers, despite their potential to deter gun-related violence at
minimal cost to responsible gun owners. Red flag laws differ from
prohibited purchaser laws that prevent specific groups of individuals
from owning, purchasing, or possessing firearms because they can be
applied to any at-risk individual.11 They also differ from laws requiring
removal of firearms from prohibited possessors because a court can order
firearm removal from anyone if it determines that they are at high risk for
violence, regardless of whether they have committed a crime, been
diagnosed with a mental illness, or have otherwise been disqualified from

(concluding that when providing post-disaster mental health services, suicide rates can eventually
increase even if they initially decrease). These results are consistent with other studies considering
changes in suicide rates after a disaster. See, e.g., Evelyn J. Bromet & Johan M. Havenaar,
Psychological and Perceived Health Effects of the Chernobyl Disaster: A 20-year Review, 93
HEALTH PHYSICS 516, 519 (2007) (long-term excess suicide deaths among Chernobyl nuclear
disaster clean-up workers); Hitoshi Ohto et al., Suicide Rates in the Aftermath of the 2011
Earthquake in Japan, 385 LANCET 1727, 1727 (2015) (finding that suicide mortality decreased
during the first two years after the disaster but subsequently rose, and hypothesizing that “when the
evacuations . . . peaked, there was . . . a collective feeling of concern and altruism . . . . However,
once the new reality caused by the triple disaster set in, increased demoralization and anxiety,
combined with restricted employment and movement of young families to urban areas, triggered a
rise in suicide . . . .”).
8. This Article will use singular they throughout.
9. See Extreme Risk Protection Orders, GIFFORDS L. CENT.,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/extreme-riskprotection-orders/ [https://perma.cc/NXY9-WKCL] (Feb. 22, 2021) (explaining that extreme risk
laws create a process by which family members or law enforcement can report an individual’s red
flag behaviors and restrict that individual’s access to firearms through judicial order).
10. See infra Section II.A (exploring the documented link between guns and violence).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (stating that, under federal law, formal and involuntary
commitment to a mental institution, being found not guilty by reason of insanity, or some other
formal adjudicative proceeding regarding their mental illness is necessary to prevent a person
suffering from mental illness from purchasing or possessing a firearm); see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11
(2021) (defining “adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution”);18
U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (stating that a person who has committed a violent act toward others is only
prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law if they are subject to a domestic violence
restraining order, have been convicted of a felony, or have been convicted of a domestic violence
misdemeanor). Most states have laws mirroring the federal prohibitions on gun possession by
seriously mentally ill individuals, and every jurisdiction now has domestic violence laws. See e.g.,
Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic
Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 52, 59 (2000). However, these laws do not provide
a process to disarm high-risk individuals who have not been adjudicated mentally ill, nor do
domestic violence orders protect individuals other than the victim, such as people outside the
family, or a suicidal individual. Id.
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possessing a firearm.12 By providing a legal framework for identifying
and disarming high-risk individuals, red flag laws may decrease the
overall rates of firearm-related fatalities, including homicides, suicides,
and mass shootings.
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia currently have red flag
laws.13 In light of their increasing popularity, and in order to inform
policymakers considering future laws and expansions of existing laws, it
is important to empirically evaluate their effectiveness. I exploit variation
in the existence and timing of enactment of red flag laws across states to
examine their effect on homicide and suicide rates. 14 Because fatality
data are available through 2018, I constrain my analysis to the red flag
laws of five states: Connecticut, Indiana, California, Washington, and
Oregon.15 With a difference-in-differences approach, I find that red flag
laws reduce firearm-related suicides by about 6.4%, with no statistically
significant substitution to non-firearm suicides.16 Red flag laws have no
statistically significant effect on overall or firearm-related homicides.17
My data and approach offer advantages over previous work in this
area.18 My difference-in-differences approach levies variation within

12. The Effects of Extreme Risk Protection Orders, RAND (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/extreme-risk-protection-orders.html
[https://perma.cc/6YTH-4QTP].
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150 (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-103 (2019); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 29-38c (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7701, 7704 (2020); FLA. STAT.
§ 790.401(3)(a) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-65 (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35,
67/40 (2019); IND. CODE § 35-47-14-2 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-602 (West
2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131R (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.590 (2020); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:58-21, 23 (West 2019); N.M STAT. ANN. § 40-17-1–13 (2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340,
6341 (MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.527 (2020); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4 (2020);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.14 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 7.94.020(2), 7.94.030(1) (2020); D.C. CODE § 7-2510.01–7-2510.13 (2020).
14. Cause of death data are from CDC Wonder 1979-1998, supra note 3 (providing access to
public health data, statistical research, policy concerns, etc.).
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c (2020); IND. CODE §§ 35-47-14-1, 35-47-14-2 (West 2020);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18100–18165 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.94.010–7.94.050
(2020); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.525–166.537 (2020). The details of these states’ statutes are
summarized in Appendix Table A.1.
16. See infra Section IV.C (explaining data reports concerning firearm-related suicides pre- and
post-red flag law enactment).
17. See infra Section IV.C (explaining data concerning firearm-related homicides pre- and postred flag law enactment).
18. For previous work in the field of red flag laws and suicide outcomes, see Jeffrey W.
Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law:
Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2017) [hereinafter Swanson
Connecticut] (empirically analyzing the results of red flag laws in Connecticut); Jeffrey W.
Swanson et al., Criminal Justice and Suicide Outcomes with Indiana’s Risk-Based Gun Seizure
Law, 47 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 188 (2019) [hereinafter Swanson Indiana] (discussing
statistical effects of the red flag law in Indiana).
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states across time and is more resilient against threats to identification.19
Additionally, to my knowledge, I am the first to examine the impact of
red flag laws on homicides, which could inform the motivation for
passing these laws. Finally, I am also the first to examine the differential
impact of these laws on different race and gender groups. With respect to
policy implications, red flag laws represent a narrowly targeted but
effective policy that balances the rights of gun owners and the
externalities associated with widespread firearm availability.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I gives an overview of existing
red flag laws and state-level variation. Part II provides background on
suicide and homicide prevention, with a focus on the relationship
between firearms and violence and the ways in which red flag laws affect
this interplay. Part III evaluates the existing literature on the effects of red
flag laws on suicide. Part IV walks through the methodology and results
of my difference-in-differences framework. Then, in Part V, I consider
the implications of my findings.
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE LAWS AND VARIATION
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia currently have red flag
laws.20 The orders issued under these laws are variously called extreme
risk protection orders,21 gun violence restraining orders,22 risk
warrants,23 and proceedings for the seizure and retention of a firearm.24
Before 2018, only five states—Connecticut (1999), Indiana (2005),
California (2014), Washington (2015), and Oregon (2017)—had passed
these laws.25 In each of the first three states, the laws were passed in
19. See Aaron J. Kivisto & Peter Lee Phalen, Effects of Risk-Based Firearm Seizure Laws in
Connecticut and Indiana on Suicide Rates, 1981–2015, 69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 855 (2018)
(looking at the effects of red flag laws in Connecticut and Indiana until 2015). In addition to
Connecticut and Indiana, my study includes California, Washington, and Oregon, which is made
possible by three additional years of mortality data.
20. See sources cited supra note 13.
21. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.525–166.537 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.94.010–7.94.050
(2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-601–5-610 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 4051–4061 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-14.5-103–13-14.5-114 (2019). New Mexico calls
the orders associated with its law Extreme Risk Firearm Protection Orders. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4017-1–40-17-13 (2020). Florida calls them Risk Protection Orders. FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (2020).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18100–18165 (West 2020).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c (2020); see also Connecticut Risk Warrants: A Guide to the
Process,
JOHNS
HOPKINS
BLOOMBERG
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH,
https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/website-media/high-impact/ERPO/stateresources/ERPO_Connecticut_Risk-Warrant_Process-Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GKF-VA3V]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
24. IND. CODE §§ 35-47-14-1, 35-47-14-2 (2020).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c (2020); IND. CODE §§ 35-47-14-1, 35-47-14-2 (2020); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 18100–18165 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.94.010–7.94.050 (2020); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 166.525–166.537 (2020).
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response to highly publicized homicides: the 1998 Connecticut Lottery
mass shooting, the 2004 murder of an Indiana police officer by a mentally
ill man, and the 2014 killings of students near the University of
California, Santa Barbara.26 In 2018, following the Stoneman Douglas
High School shooting in Parkland, Florida, the number of states with red
flag laws more than doubled to include Florida, Vermont, Maryland,
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Massachusetts, Illinois, and the
District of Columbia.27 In 2019 and 2020, New York, Colorado, Nevada,
Hawaii, New Mexico, and Virginia also passed these laws.28 Eleven other
states are currently considering such legislation.29
The laws vary in their details, but the general scheme is that a person
with reason to believe that a gun owner presents a danger to themselves
or others may petition a state court to order the temporary removal of
firearms.30 The order also prevents the individual subject to it from
purchasing or possessing firearms.31 A court decides whether to issue the
order based on statements or actions by the gun owner in question.
Evidence might include threats of violence by the respondent toward
themselves or others, a violation of a domestic violence restraining order,

26. See Timothy Williams, What Are ‘Red Flag’ Gun Laws, and How Do They Work?, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/red-flag-laws.html
[https://perma.cc/U79V-BJGZ] (explaining that the Connecticut legislature passed the first red flag
law in 1999 after a state lottery worker killed four employees and himself). In 2014, the California
legislature passed a red flag law after a gunman killed six people near U.C. Santa Barbara. Id. See
also Ind. State Police Legal Off., Jake Laird Law: Indiana’s “Red Flag” Statute, IN.GOV,
https://www.in.gov/isp/files/Jake%20Laird%20Law%20(Final%20Revision)%20July%202020%
20-%20Barbie.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8ZM-7NYZ] (May 2019) (detailing the red flag law passed
by the Indiana legislature in 2005 after an officer was killed by a man who was not prevented from
retrieving his firearms shortly after being released from emergency detention at a hospital).
27. FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4051–4061 (2019); MD. CODE
ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-601–5-610 (West 2020); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-8.3-1–8-8.3.14 (2020);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-20–2C:58-32 (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7701, 7704
(2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131R (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/ (2019); D.C. CODE
§§ 7-2510.04–7-2510.13 (2020).
28. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-14.5-103–13-14.5-1114 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13465 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.590 (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-17-1–40-17-13 (2020); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. §§ 6340–6347 (MCKINNEY 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.14 (2020).
29. As of Jan. 14, 2021, there were active red flag bills in ten state legislatures: Alaska,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Kentucky, Tennessee, and North
Carolina. Sean Campbell et al., Red Flag Laws: Where the Bills Stand in Each State, TRACE,
https://www.thetrace.org/2018/03/red-flag-laws-pending-bills-tracker-nra/
[https://perma.cc/4NVD-SH3B] (Jan. 14, 2021).
30. See Reena Kapoor et al., APA Resource Document on Risk-Based Gun Removal Laws, 37
DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 6, 8 (2018) (outlining the typical framework for risk-based gun removal);
RAND, supra note 12 (providing another outline of risk-based gun removal).
31. RAND, supra note 12 (explaining that a court may temporarily restrict an individual’s
access to firearms if it determines that they are at high risk for firearm violence).
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or recent acquisition of a significant number of firearms.32 If
implemented, the order lasts about six to twelve months, but the person
subject to the order is usually given the opportunity to request a hearing
to terminate the order.33 Refusal to comply with the order is punishable
as a criminal offense.34 After a set time, the guns are returned to the
person from whom they were seized unless another court hearing extends
the period of confiscation.35
There is state variation along several dimensions. Seven states allow
only law enforcement to petition for removal orders, but twelve states and
the District of Columbia allow other individuals, including family and
household members, to petition.36 All states offer both ex parte orders,
allowing eligible individuals to petition for orders in emergency cases
without waiting to provide notice of a hearing to the respondent, and final
orders after a notice and a hearing.37 Most final orders last one
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18155(b)(1) (West 2020). Additionally, petitioners must also
usually include information they have about firearms the respondent possesses. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 18107 (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7703(a), 7704(a) (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-2510.02 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 790.401(2)(e) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-63(b)
(2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT 67/35(a), 67/40(a) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5602(a), 5-603(a) (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131R(b) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-23(b) (West 2020); N.M STAT. ANN. §§ 40-17-5, 6 (2020); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-3(f)
(2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053(c)(3)(B) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.030(4) (2020).
33. See Kapoor et al., supra note 30, at 8 (outlining the basics of the gun removal process);
RAND, supra note 12 (providing resources regarding risk protection orders).
34. Gun Safety: Laws, Licenses and Background Checks, PROMISE THE CHILD. (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.promisethechildren.org/news/gun-safety-laws-licenses-and-background-checks/
[https://perma.cc/F9DQ-JG9D].
35. See Kapoor et al., supra note 30, at 8 (explaining that individuals can petition to have their
firearms returned, and if risk-based criteria are not met, then the court orders the return of the
firearms); RAND, supra note 12 (describing the process by which a risk protection order is
maintained).
36. States that allow individuals outside of law enforcement to petition for removal orders
include California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150
(West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-104 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7701, 7704
(2020) (family and household members can petition for non-emergency orders); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 134-61 (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35, 67/40 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5601(e)(2) (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131R (2020); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 33.560 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-21 (West 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340, 6341
(MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.527 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.030(1) (2020).
Maryland has gone the farthest, allowing medical and mental health professionals, spouses and
cohabitants, other family members, co-parents, current dating partners, and current or former legal
guardians to file petitions. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-601(e)(2) (West 2021).
37. Ex parte firearm removal orders are permitted in California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150(b) (West 2020);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-103 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7703 (2020); FLA. STAT.
§ 790.401(4)(a) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-64 (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35 (2020);
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 5-603 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131R,
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year.38 Ex parte orders last for shorter periods, and there is greater
variability in their length, ranging from one to two days in Maryland to
up to twenty-one days in California and Oregon.39 There is also variation
in the standards of proof required for ex parte40 and final orders.41 To
131S, 131T (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-23 (West 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340–42
(MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.527 (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4 (2020); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054(a)(1) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.050 (2020); D.C. CODE § 72510.04 (2020). Some states allow ex parte removal only when the petitioner is law enforcement
(Delaware, Florida, Rhode Island, and Vermont). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7703 (2020); FLA.
STAT. § 790.401(4)(a) (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 4054(a)(1) (2019). Other states allow ex parte petitions by a larger group of petitioners, including
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-61, 64 (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/5, 67/35 (2020); MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-601(e)(2), 5-602, 5-603 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140,
§§ 121, 131R, 131S, 131T (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-21 (West 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§§ 6340–6342 (MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.525, 166.527 (2020); WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.94.050 (2020).
38. Exceptions are Illinois (six months), Vermont (six months), Virginia (six months) and New
Jersey (indefinitely until respondent demonstrates by preponderance of the evidence that they are
no longer a danger). 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053 (2019);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.14 (2020), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-25 (West 2020). California’s final
orders last from one to five years depending on the court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18175(d) (West
2020).
39. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-603 (West 2021) (providing that the hearing must
be on the first or second day on which a district court judge is sitting); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 166.527(9) (2020) (giving the respondent thirty days to request a hearing, and then the hearing
must occur within 21 days of the request); CAL. PENAL CODE § 18155(c) (West 2021) (stating that
the order lasts twenty-one days).
40. Thirteen jurisdictions require probable, reasonable, or good cause to obtain an ex parte
order: California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Nevada, New
York, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 18150 (West 2021) (allowing only law enforcement to petition for ex parte orders); FLA. STAT.
§ 790.401(3)(a) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-64(f) (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35,
67/40 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-601(e)(2) (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
140 § 131R (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-23 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.560–33.590
(2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340–6341 (MCKINNEY 2021); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4 (2020); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.14 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.94.030(1), 7.94.020(2) (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-2510.04 (2020). California requires a substantial likelihood of harm when the petitioner
is family or law enforcement. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150(b) (West 2021). Four states, Colorado,
Delaware, Nevada, and Vermont require a preponderance of the evidence. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1314.5-103 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7703(d) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.560–33.590
(2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054(b)(1) (2019). Oregon requires clear and convincing
evidence. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.527(6) (2020). However, Oregon’s orders become final
automatically if unchallenged by the respondent, and this higher standard of proof is commensurate
with other states’ requirements for final orders. Id.
41. Six jurisdictions require a preponderance of the evidence for final orders: District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Washington. D.C. CODE § 72510.04 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-65(c) (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 131S(c)
(2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-24(b) (West 2020); 2020 N.M. Laws ch. 5, § 8; WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.94.030(1) (2020). Twelve states require clear and convincing evidence for final orders:
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Virginia. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-
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obtain an ex parte order, the alleged danger must be imminent in all states
except for Massachusetts, New York, and the District of Columbia.42 To
renew a final order, the petitioner generally must meet the same burden
of proof using the same categories of evidence they used to obtain the
initial final order. Individuals subject to an order may usually also request
one hearing during the effective period of the order, at which they bear
the burden of proving, by the same standard used to obtain the order, that
they no longer pose a risk of harm.43 To date, no court has invalidated a
red flag law on constitutional or other grounds.44
Despite variation in the details of red flag laws, each state’s law is
designed to respond to acute periods of elevated risk of violence by
identifying and disarming high-risk individuals.45 The next part will
examine red flag laws’ potential to accomplish these goals, beginning
with background on suicide and homicide prevention and subsequently
analyzing how red flag laws affect this interplay.

103 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7701, 7704 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 790.401(3)(a) (2020);
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35, 67/40 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-601(e)(2) (West
2021); 2019 Nev. Stat. 4172; N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340, 6341 (MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 166.527(6)(a) (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.14 (2020).
42. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 131T (2020) (allowing the courts to issue an ex parte order
where reasonable cause exists to believe respondents pose a risk to themselves or others by
possessing firearms); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6342 (MCKINNEY 2021); D.C. CODE § 7-2510.04 (2020)
(permitting issuance of ex parte orders where probable exists to believe respondents pose a
significant danger of injuring themselves or others by possessing firearms).
43. Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 193 (explaining that in Connecticut, most
individuals subject to an order failed to appear in court and lost their legal gun access by default).
44. Courts in Connecticut, Indiana, and Florida that have heard challenges to red flag laws have
held that the laws do not violate the due process rights of respondents and/or are constitutional
under the Second Amendment. See Hope v. Connecticut, 133 A.3d 519, 524–25 (Conn. App. Ct.
2016) (finding Connecticut’s red flag law does not implicate and thus does not violate the second
amendment); see also Redington v. Indiana, 992 N.E.2d 823, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), transf.
denied, 997 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2013) (rejecting challenges based on the Second Amendment, the
Indiana right to bear arms, the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and vagueness); see also
Davis v. Gilchrist Cty. Sheriff's Office, 280 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
45. Jon S. Vernick et al., Background Checks for All Gun Buyers and Gun Violence Restraining
Orders: State Efforts to Keep Guns from High-Risk Persons, 45 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 98, 100–01
(2017) (arguing that their targeted nature could make risk-based seizure laws an effective violence
prevention strategy).
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II. SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE PREVENTION
A. The Relationship Between Guns and Violence
Most people who attempt suicide do not die.46 Figure 1 below
illustrates the male and female case fatality rates of several common
methods of suicide attempt—most methods are less than fifty percent
successful. The major preventable exception is firearm-related suicide,
whose fatality rate is more than forty times that of drug poisoning, the
most common method of suicide attempt.47 As a result, firearms are
responsible for about fifty percent of suicides in the United States.
Because firearms are such an effective means of suicide, preventing
firearm suicide attempts may be one of the most effective ways to prevent
suicide deaths overall.

46. The case fatality rate considering every method of suicide is about 8.5% (14.7% for males
vs. 3.3% for females). Andrew Conner et al., Suicide Case-Fatality Rates in the United States, 2007
to 2014, 171 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 885, 889 (2019). About ninety percent of people who
survive near-lethal suicide attempts eventually die from something other than suicide. See David
Owens et al., Fatal and Non-Fatal Repetition of Self-Harm, 181 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 193, 195–
96 (2002) (systematically reviewing published observational and experimental studies following
up on non-fatal suicide attempts); Bo Runeson et al., Suicide Risk After Nonfatal Self-Harm: A
National Cohort Study, 2000–2008, 76 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 240, 243–45 (2015) (following
Swedish individuals admitted to hospital after deliberate self-harm for three to nine years); Richard
H. Seiden, Where Are They Now? A Follow-Up Study of Suicide Attempters from the Golden Gate
Bridge, 8 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV., 203, 214 (1978) (providing evidence that an
anti-suicide barrier on the Golden Gate Bridge would save lives, rather than simply diverting
would-be bridge jumpers to some other method of suicide); Dag Tidemalm et al., Risk of Suicide
After Suicide Attempt According to Coexisting Psychiatric Disorder: Swedish Cohort Study with
Long Term Follow-up, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 1328, 1328 (2008) (finding that the absolute risk of
completed suicide in suicide attempters followed for five to thirty-seven years was seven to thirteen
percent). Additionally, approximately seventy-five percent of suicide attempters do not go on to
make another attempt. See Owens et al., supra at 195–96 (measuring fatal and non-fatal repetition
of self-harm); see also Seiden, supra at 214 (following up on suicide attempts from the Golden
Gate Bridge).
47. Overall, drug poisoning accounts for 59.4% of suicidal acts, but only 13.5% of deaths.
Conner et al., supra note 46, at 888–92 (qualifying suicide attempts and death by type). It has a case
fatality rate of 1.9%. Id. Firearms account for only 4.8% of suicidal acts, but 50.6% of suicide
deaths. Id. They have a case fatality rate of 89.6%. Id. Multi-state data from the 1990s shows very
similar trends. Rebecca Spicer & Ted R. Miller, Suicide Acts in 8 States: Incidence and Case
Fatality Rates by Demographics and Method, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1885, 1888 (2000). During
that period, drug poisoning had a case fatality rate of 1.5% and firearms had a case fatality rate of
82.5%. Id.
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Figure 1: Case Fatality Rate (%) by Suicide Method48
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Restricting access to a chosen means of suicide can effectively
discourage some would-be suicide attempts entirely without diverting
them to other means of suicide.49 The literature on interventions at
“suicide hotspots”—locations such as bridges, tall buildings, and railway
tracks, where a disproportionate number of suicides occur—provides
strong evidence that means restriction, such as the installation of physical
barriers, is an effective way to avert suicide without substitution to other
48. Figure created using Table 4 in Conner et al., supra note 46, at 892 (categorizing suicide
mortality rates by method, as well as by sex, age group, religion, urbanization, and year).
49. Brian W. Bauer & Daniel W. Capron, How Behavioral Economics and Nudges Could Help
Diminish Irrationality in Suicide-Related Decisions, 15 PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 44, 45 (2020) (“If the
thesis were true that most people who want to kill themselves will . . ., it is more likely that we
would see higher rates of means substitution and a decrease in survivor rates. Instead, these studies
suggest that people retrospectively find greater utility in continuing to live their life after a suicidal
crisis has ended compared with the prospect of ending their life.”).
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methods.50 Restricting access to carbon monoxide and toxic substances
has also effectively reduced suicides.51
There is also extensive literature focusing specifically on access to
firearms and suicide. The overall findings indicate that reducing access
to firearms is associated with lower firearm suicide rates, sometimes with
substitution to other methods of suicide.52 Lower gun ownership rates
and firearm purchase delays lead to lower suicide rates, despite some

50. Georgina R. Cox et al., Interventions to Reduce Suicides at Suicide Hotspots: A Systematic
Review, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 10 (2013) (providing evidence that rates of suicide decrease
overall where intervention make impulsive suicide more difficult); See Annette L. Beautrais,
Effectiveness of Barriers at Suicide Jumping Sites: A Case Study, 35 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY
557, 559 (2001) (finding that removing a bridge safety barrier resulted in a substantial increase in
both the number and rate of suicides by jumping from that bridge, while suicides by jumping at
other sites in the city continued to decline). Although many papers find a positive correlation
between suicide rates and access to a suicide method, the research relies primarily on crosssectional data, limiting the strength of the conclusions. E.g., The Relationship Between Firearm
Availability and Suicide, GUN POL’Y IN AM., https://www.rand.org/research/gunpolicy/analysis/essays/firearm-availability-suicide.html [https://perma.cc/V7GC-QZKC] (March
2, 2018).
51. See Norman Kreitman, The Coal Gas Story: United Kingdom Suicide Rates, 1960-71, 30
BRIT. J. PREVENTATIVE & SOC. MED. 86, 87–88 (1976) (concluding that replacing coal with oilbased and natural gas heating and thereby decreasing access to carbon monoxide in the general
public led to a decrease in carbon monoxide suicide); Keith Hawton et al., Effects of Legislation
Restricting Pack Sizes of Paracetamol and Salicylate on Self Poisoning in the United Kingdom:
Before and After Study, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 1203, 1209 (2001) (finding that deaths from paracetamol
and salicylate poisoning decreased significantly in the year following a change in legislation
limiting the size of packs of the medications sold over-the-counter); Stephen Wilkinson et al.,
Admissions to Hospital for Deliberate Self-Harm in England 1995–2000: An Analysis of Hospital
Episode Statistics, 24 J. PUB. HEALTH MED. 179, 183 (2002) (finding that paracetamol package
size regulations and increased prescription of anti-depressants resulted in fewer intentional drug
overdoses); see also Marc S. Daigle, Suicide Prevention Through Means Restriction: Assessing the
Risk of Substitution: A Critical Review and Synthesis, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
625, 629–30 (2005) (reviewing studies examining restricted access to domestic toxic gas, firearms,
toxic substances, and bridges and concluding that means restriction can avert suicide without
substitution to other methods).
52. See, e.g., Matthew Lang, Firearm Background Checks and Suicide, 123 ECON. J. 1085, 1087
(2013) (using firearm background checks as a proxy for changes in firearm ownership rates to
establish a positive causal relationship between suicides and firearm ownership); Michael D.
Anestis & Joye C. Anestis, Suicide Rates and State Laws Regulating Access and Exposure to
Handguns, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2049, 2056 (2015) (finding that waiting periods, universal
background checks, gun laws, and open carrying regulations were all associated with lower firearm
suicide rates and that each policy except for waiting periods was associated with lower overall
suicide rates); A. L. Beautrais et al., Firearms Legislation and Reductions in Firearm-Related
Suicide Deaths in New Zealand, 40 AUS. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 253, 258–59 (2006) (finding that
the effects of the 1992 New Zealand Amendment to the Arms Act, which restricted access to
firearms, were consistent with a reduction in firearm-related suicide, particularly in impulsive
suicide attempts by young men); but see Mark Duggan et al., The Short-Term and Localized Effect
of Gun Shows: Evidence from California and Texas, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 786, 786 (2011)
(finding no evidence that gun shows led to increases in either gun homicides or suicides in the short
run in the geographic area surrounding the shows).
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method substitution.53 Military policies requiring soldiers to leave their
firearms on base when they take weekend leave and gun buybacks may
also reduce firearm-related and overall suicide.54
The evidence on the relationship between access to firearms and
homicide is more mixed. There is economic theory consistent with either
a positive or negative relationship; the existence of gun-wielding lawabiding citizens might deter would-be criminals, or the greater
availability of firearms might increase the fatality rate of criminal
activity.55 There is empirical evidence for either theory. Many studies
have found that fewer firearms are associated with lower rates of firearmrelated homicide.56 Other studies have found that handgun ownership has
53. See Justin T. Briggs & Alexander Tabarrok, Firearms and Suicides in US States, 37 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 180, 187 (2014) (finding that if all states reduced gun ownership by ten percentage
points, we would expect five to nine percent fewer suicides); see also Griffin Edwards et al.,
Looking Down the Barrel of a Loaded Gun: The Effect of Mandatory Handgun Purchase Delays
on Homicide and Suicide, 128 ECON. J. 3117, 3118 (2017) (using a difference-in-differences
approach to exploit within-state variation across time in both the existence and length of explicit
wait periods and delays created by licensing requirements, and finding that any firearm purchase
delay led to a two to five percent decrease in firearm-related suicides, with no effect on non-firearmrelated suicides); but see Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated
with Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 585,
588 (2000) (finding that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was associated with lower
firearm suicide rates in people older than fifty-five but not for any other group).
54. In the Israeli Defense Force, requiring soldiers to leave their firearms on base when they
took weekend leave was associated with a forty percent suicide rate decrease mostly attributable to
a reduction in weekend firearm suicides. Gad Lubin et al., Decrease in Suicide Rates After a Change
of Policy Reducing Access to Firearms in Adolescents: A Naturalistic Epidemiological Study, 40
SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 421, 422 (2010). Because the Israeli Defense Force is a
mandatory population-based army drafting all eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-old youth, although
this study had no control group, the study might be externally valid to other groups of youth. Id. at
423. For gun buyback, see, e.g., Andrew Leigh & Christine Neill, Do Gun Buybacks Save Lives?
Evidence from Panel Data, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 509, 511 (2010) (finding that the 1997
Australian gun buyback, which reduced Australia’s firearm stock by about one-fifth, led to an
almost eighty percent decrease in firearm suicide rates, with no substitution to non-firearm death
rates). See also Beautrais et al., supra note 52, at 258–59 (finding that the effects of the 1992 New
Zealand Amendment to the Arms Act, which restricted access to firearms, were consistent with a
reduction in firearm-related suicide, particularly in impulsive suicide attempts by young men).
55. Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1086–87, 1112 (2001)
(discussing both theories and providing empirical support for the theory that increased gun
ownership leads to substantial increases in the overall homicide rate); see also Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203
(2003) (discussing both theories).
56. See, e.g., Duggan, supra note 55, at 1088 (showing that changes in homicide and gun
ownership are positively causally related and refuting the potential explanation that individuals
purchase guns in response to expected future increases in crime); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig,
The Social Costs of Gun Ownership, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 379, 380 (2006) (using the percentage of
suicides committed with a gun as a proxy for gun prevalence to show that gun prevalence is possibly
causally related with gun homicide rates); Ayres & Donohue, supra note 55, at 1202 (refuting the
evidence in Lott & Mustard, infra note 58, and finding that right-to-carry laws are associated with
more crime); Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from
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no effect on crime,57 and there is yet another large literature finding that
right-to-carry laws, which increase firearm access, are associated with
lower homicide rates.58
B. Red Flag Laws and Gun Violence
Although the potential impact of red flag laws depends on how the
policies are used in practice, it is possible to predict the theoretical
direction of the relationship.59 If courts can correctly identify individuals
who pose a high risk of violence by simply observing their behavior
rather than relying on specific criminal or mental health histories, then
red flag laws could decrease suicides and homicides in addition to those
prevented by existing interventions.60
State Panel Data, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1998) (exploiting minimum age
requirements for concealed-carry permits to show that right-to-carry laws have increased adult
homicide rates).
57. See, e.g., Carlisle E. Moody & Thomas B. Marvell, Guns and Crime, 71 S. ECON. J. 720,
720 (2005) (using the General Social Survey to proxy gun ownership and finding that handguns
have a negligible effect on crime); Duggan et al., supra note 52, at 786 (finding no evidence that
gun shows lead to increases in either gun homicides or suicides in the short run in the geographic
area surrounding the shows).
58. See, e.g., John Lott Jr. & David Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 48 (1997) (using cross-sectional time-series data to show that
allowing concealed weapon carry deters violent crimes without increasing accidental deaths);
Florenz Plassmann & John Whitley, Confirming “More Guns, Less Crime,” 55 STAN. L. REV.
1313, 1313 (2003) (analyzing county-level data and finding lower homicide rates each year a rightto-carry law was in effect from 1997 to 2000); William Bartley & Mark A. Cohen, The Effect of
Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 258, 258 (1998)
(examining the results from Lott & Mustard, supra, and finding that they too are robust to be
dismissed as unfounded); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Using Placebo Tests to Test “More
Guns, Less Crime”, 4 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2004) (finding that the effects
of right-to-carry laws on crime are less well-estimated than Lott & Mustard, supra, and Lott, infra,
suggest, but that their theory is supported); Charles Manski & John Pepper, How Do Right-to-Carry
Laws Affect Crime Rates? Coping with Ambiguity Using Bounded-Variation Assumptions, 100
REV. ECON. & STAT. 232, 232 (2018) (finding that the effect of right-to-carry laws vary greatly
depending on variables including location and type of crime); see generally JOHN LOTT, MORE
GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (3d ed. 2000) (expanding
on the argument in Lott & Mustard, supra).
59. There is no systematic information collected about the number of gun removal orders served
nationwide, but there is some state data. In California in 2016, eighty-six orders were served, in
Washington in 2018, forty-eight orders were served. Between 2006 and 2013 in Indiana, fifty-eight
orders were served per year, and between 1999 and 2013 in Connecticut, fifty-one orders were
served per year. RAND, supra note 12. George Parker, Circumstances and Outcomes of a Firearm
Seizure Law: Marion County, Indiana, 2006-2013, 33 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 308, 313 (2015)
[hereinafter Parker Indiana]; Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 189. By contrast, in the first
six months of Maryland’s ERPO law that went into effect in October 2018, the state granted 258
orders. Alex Yablon, Use of Red Flag Laws Varies Widely Among Local Police, TRACE (Apr. 23,
2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/04/use-of-red-flag-laws-varies-widely-among-local-police/
[https://perma.cc/XC6M-RT2Y].
60. See, e.g., Vernick et al., supra note 45, at 100–01 (arguing that their targeted nature could
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Although high-profile homicides precipitated the passage of red flag
laws in several states, available data suggest that petitions for removal
orders most commonly cite concerns about self-harm or suicide as the
reason for removal.61 Therefore, the impact of red flag laws might be
concentrated in suicide rates rather than rates of mass shootings or
homicides.
Up to eighty percent of people considering suicide give some sign of
their intentions.62 By allowing those most likely to notice signs of
suicidal ideation to intervene using the legal system, red flag laws could
reduce suicide rates by directly interrupting suicidal plans.63 As discussed
above, restricting access to suicide means can permanently prevent
suicide attempts and deaths.64 Reducing access to firearms as a means of
suicide, as red flag laws do, may be particularly effective because of
firearms’ outsized case fatality rate.65
Red flag laws are usually enacted in response to high-profile mass
shootings, not overall spikes in firearm homicides.66 Nevertheless, by
make risk-based seizure laws effective); Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 195 (finding that in
both Connecticut and Indiana, the most common use of gun-removal laws was in cases where
concerned family members noticed signs of suicide risk).
61. See, e.g., George Parker, Application of a Firearm Seizure Law Aimed at Dangerous
Persons: Outcomes from the First Two Years, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 478, 478 (2010) [hereinafter
Parker, First Two Years] (“Firearm seizure by police was rarely a result of psychosis; instead, risk
of suicide was the leading reason.”); Parker Indiana, supra note 59, at 308 (finding that in Indiana,
removals were prompted by threatened or attempted suicide 68% of the time; violence 21%; and
psychosis 16%); Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 192 (finding that about 61% of gun
removal requests in Connecticut cited concern about self-harm, 32% cited risk of harm to others,
and 9% cited both categories); Garen Wintemute, Extreme Risk Protection Orders Intended to
Prevent Mass Shootings: A Case Series, ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 655, 657(2019) (finding that
only 13% of removals in California involved an individual deemed at risk of perpetrating a mass
shooting).
62. Extreme Risk Protection Orders, supra note 9 (citing Suicide, MENTAL HEALTH AM. (last
visited Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.mhanational.org/conditions/suicide [https://perma.cc/GT6GWQFB]).
63. See Parker Indiana, supra note 59, at 308 (“Overall, the Indiana law removed weapons from
a small number of people, most of whom did not seek return of their weapons. The firearm seizure
law thus functioned as a months-long cooling-off period for those who did seek the return of their
guns.”); see also Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 195 (finding that in both Connecticut and
Indiana, the most common use of gun-removal laws was in cases where concerned family members
noticed signs of suicide risk).
64. See supra Section II.A.
65. See supra Figure 1.
66. See supra INTRODUCTION. About 75% of homicides in the United States use firearms.
Assault
or
Homicide,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm [https://perma.cc/YRR2-ZNTS] (last visited Mar.
2, 2021) (providing that in 2018, 14,414 of the 19,141 homicides in the United States were firearm
homicides). These overall statistics are at a level of aggregation that is unaffected by excluding
deaths from mass shootings from this overall homicide risk. Only about 378 people per year are
killed in mass shootings. See supra note 1 (averaging the number of individuals killed in mass
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removing firearms from at-risk individuals, red flag laws have the
potential to reduce firearm homicides in all settings, whether in the home
or in public. There are reasons to believe that red flag laws might be less
effective in reducing homicides than suicides, however. As noted above,
most removal petitions cite risk to self rather than risk to others as the
reason for removal.67 Additionally, red flag laws are modeled after
domestic violence firearm-removal laws, which exist at the federal level
and in many states.68 Red flag laws might be redundant in the domestic
violence context because there is already a route for people in these
situations to petition for firearm removal. The incremental effect of red
flag laws on domestic homicides, a large contributor to total homicide
deaths, might therefore be small.69 Additionally, a majority of criminals
report obtaining firearms through nontraditional channels such as theft,
family members or friends, or private sales on the secondary market, and
criminals may be more likely to have access to alternate means of
accessing weapons even were they subject to a red flag protection order.70
shootings from 2013 through 2019 based off figures from the Gun Violence Archive) (figures on
file with author).
67. See supra note 61 (providing multiple sets of data that show red flag laws are used
predominately in response to suicide risk).
68. Waul, supra note 11, at 52, 59.
69. See, e.g., Emiko Petrosky et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women
and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 2003–2014, 66 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
741,
741
(2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/pdfs/mm6628a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJR9-5J5U]
(almost half of female homicides are committed by the victim’s current or former male partner);
Parker Indiana, supra note 59, at 308 (Red flag firearm seizures in Indiana occurred as a result of
domestic disputes in 28% of cases, possibly substituting for what would otherwise have been
domestic violence-related firearm removal).
70. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a
Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2009) (“[T]he 30 to 40 percent of all
gun transfers that do not involve licensed dealers . . . accounts for most guns used in crime . . . .”);
JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF
FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 16 (expanded ed. 1994) (explaining that forty percent of handguns
are obtained from friends and forty-three percent are purchased for cash); Philip J. Cook & Anthony
A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses of New Data on
Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 291 (2001) (“Over 500,000 guns are stolen each year
from private homes and vehicles, a number which is apparently sufficient to satisfy the ‘needs’ of
robbers and drug dealers.”); Leila Nadya Sadat & Madaline M. George, Gun Violence and Human
Rights, 60 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (2019) (“The median age of school shooters is sixteen (too
young to buy a firearm in any state) and the federal government has reported that in most school
shootings, the gun used was taken from the shooter’s home or that of a relative.”). A 2000 Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives inspection revealed that nearly half of all firearms
dealers could not account for all of their guns, more than half were out of record-keeping
compliance, and they had made nearly 700 sales to potential traffickers. James V. Grimaldi & Sari
Horwitz, Industry Pressure Hides Gun Traces, Protects Dealers from Public Scrutiny, WASH. POST
(Oct.
24,
2010,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/23/AR2010102302996_2.html?sid=ST2010102304311
[https://perma.cc/4AUC-RZ5N].
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It is possible that red flag laws could still affect homicides indirectly by
affecting the prevalence of guns in a state—either by changing the violent
crime rate or changing the fatality rate of criminal activity. However,
because of the targeted, risk-based nature of the laws, it seems unlikely
that enough of the critical mass of firearms in a given population would
change to affect homicide through these channels.71
Red flag laws’ targeted nature gives them some advantages over other
gun control policies such as purchase restrictions, delays, and other
removal laws. Unlike purchaser restrictions that prevent specific groups
of individuals—such as those with a criminal record, history of domestic
abuse, or dishonorable military discharge—from owning, purchasing,
and possessing firearms, red flag laws affect at-risk individuals who
already own firearms, not only those who would need to purchase a gun
in order to carry out their plan.72 Red flag laws also differ from prohibited
possessors laws, because they can affect anyone at high risk for firearm
violence, regardless of whether they have committed a crime, been
diagnosed with a significant mental illness, or have otherwise been
disqualified from possessing firearms.73
However, one disadvantage of red flag laws is that they may not be
uniformly applied across a state population. Two people may present the
same warning signs but only one may have their firearms removed
because of a more attentive bystander.74 Purchase delays and restrictions,
in theory, impose a barrier on everyone attempting to purchase a gun.
However, in practice, purchase restrictions and background checks are
not conducted perfectly uniformly and may miss at-risk individuals,
despite imposing costs on everyone who attempts to purchase a firearm.75
The huge number of existing firearms owned in the United States
further limits the effectiveness of policies that rely solely on stopping
potentially risky purchasers from buying new guns. Guns are durable
goods that can work for many years with minimal maintenance and be
passed down through generations.76 By some estimates, there are more

71. RAND, supra note 12 (“[A]lthough removal of firearms could have spillover effects . . .
these second-order effects are likely to be small.”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 195 (finding that in both Connecticut and Indiana, the
most common use of gun-removal laws was in cases where concerned family members noticed
signs of suicide risk).
75. Edwards et al., supra note 53, at 3118 (explaining how many states have passed firearms
legislation that impose waiting periods in addition to the federal Brady Act).
76. Cook & Braga, supra note 70, at 291 (“Since guns are highly durable commodities, used
guns appear to be a close substitute for new ones.”).
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guns than people in the United States.77 The magnitude of the existing
gun stock makes policies which allow removal of firearms from high-risk
individuals uniquely promising.
III. EXISTING LITERATURE
Three previous studies in the psychology literature have analyzed the
effects of red flag laws on suicide in Connecticut and Indiana. In two
papers, Jeffrey Swanson and coauthors analyzed individual-level data on
firearm removal cases matched to death records in Connecticut and
Indiana and concluded that the gun removal laws prevented
approximately seventy-two firearm suicides in Connecticut and thirtynine firearm suicides in Indiana.78 In these non-population-level results,
the authors also identified fifteen non-firearm and seven non-firearm
suicides in the death records of persons subjected to firearm removal in
Connecticut and Indiana respectively.79 In percentage terms, Swanson’s
Connecticut study found a 6% decrease in firearm-related suicide, which
translated to a 2% decrease in overall suicide, and the Indiana study found
more moderate 0.57% and 0.27% decreases, respectively.80 Although the
detail of these studies is impressive, their focus on individual-level data
precludes causal inference and external validity.81
The study most similar to mine is Kivisto and Phalen’s populationlevel analysis of the effect of red flag laws’ on suicides in Connecticut
and Indiana.82 Using synthetic controls, Kivisto and Phalen find that red
flag laws contributed to a 7.5% decrease in firearm-related suicides and
77. See Christopher Ingraham, There Are Now More Guns Than People in the United States
According to a New Study of Global Firearm Ownership, WASH. POST. (June 19, 2018, 9:31 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/there-are-more-guns-than-peoplein-the-united-states-according-to-a-new-study-of-global-firearm-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/U2R7-HAMZ] (combining data from the Small Arms Survey and U.S. estimates
of population to estimate that there are 120.5 guns for every 100 residents).
78. Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 202–04 (estimating that in Connecticut,
approximately twenty gun seizures were needed for every averted suicide); Swanson Indiana, supra
note 18, at 193 (estimating that in Indiana, approximately ten gun removal cases were needed to
avert each prevented suicide).
79. Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 199 (finding of the twenty-one suicides among
people subject to gun seizures during the study period, six used guns while fifteen used other
means); Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 192 (finding of the fourteen suicides among people
subject to gun removals during the study period, seven used guns while seven used other means).
80. These percentages are calculated using the estimates in the Swanson papers and the average
expected suicides in Connecticut and Indiana respectively, using data from the CDC. See Swanson
Connecticut, supra note 18, at 203 (estimating that Connecticut’s red flag law prevented seventytwo suicides over the study period); Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 193 (estimating that
Indiana’s red flag law prevented thirty-nine suicides over the study period); CDC Wonder 1999–
2019, supra note 3 (providing data on the overall suicide rates of Connecticut and Indiana).
81. This is because there is no causal research design strategy; the research design instead
involves describing observed results in specific locations.
82. Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 19, at 855.
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a 5% decrease in overall suicides in Indiana.83 In Connecticut, Kivisto
and Phalen found a 1.6% decrease in firearm-related suicide in the first
years of enactment, which became a 13.7% decrease following increased
enforcement efforts in the post-Virginia Tech (2007) period.84 However,
Connecticut’s reduction in firearm suicides was offset by increased nonfirearm suicides, resulting in an overall slight increase in suicides.85
My study offers advantages over previous empirical examinations of
red flag laws in the psychology literature. First, two previous studies
examine the effect of red flag laws on suicides only within single states.86
My difference-in-differences approach levies variation within states
across time and is more resilient against threats to identification. Second,
I build upon work by Kivisto and Phalen.87 My study includes more states
and a broader time period due to the increased availability of mortality
data, providing a more robust picture of red flag laws nationwide.88 It
uses standard difference-in-differences rather than synthetic controls as
its main empirical method. Additionally, to my knowledge, I am the first
to examine the impact of red flag laws on homicides, which could inform
the motivation for passing these laws. Finally, I am also the first to
examine the differential impact of these laws on race and gender groups.
IV. THE EFFECT OF RED FLAG LAWS ON HOMICIDES AND SUICIDES
A. Trends in Raw Data
The main dependent variables in my study are suicide and homicide
rates, in log form, by state and year. I will also examine suicide and
homicide rates separately for men, women, white, and nonwhite people.89
83. Id. at 859, 861 (finding that Indiana gun seizures prevented 383 firearm suicides but
contributed to forty-four non-firearm suicides, resulting in an overall suicide decrease over the
study period).
84. The authors argue that the Virginia Tech mass shooting affected Connecticut’s but not
Indiana’s red flag enforcement because of the “eight-year lag after the enactment of Connecticut’s
firearm seizure legislation during which time very few guns were seized, but seizure rates increased
fivefold following the mass shooting at Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007. By contrast, Indiana’s
enactment in 2005 corresponded almost immediately with meaningful levels of enforcement.” Id.
at 855.
85. The authors estimate that the Connecticut enforcement bump prevented 128 firearm-related
suicides but contributed to 140 non-firearm suicides from 2007 to 2015, offsetting the firearmrelated decrease. Id. at 861.
86. Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 202–04; Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 193.
87. Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 19, at 861.
88. I include Connecticut, Indiana, California, Washington, and Oregon’s suicide and homicide
rates from 1981 to 2018, resulting in fifteen additional state-years.
89. White/nonwhite is the most finely separated race categorization the data will allow because
of privacy constraints. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suppresses all state-level
data representing zero to nine deaths to protect privacy. Therefore, in state-years where, for
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The mortality data come from the CDC WONDER database, a
compilation of the National Center for Health Statistics’ cause of death
files.90 CDC WONDER provides death counts by state, year, cause, age,
sex, and many other breakdowns. I use firearm and non-firearm
homicides and suicides in each state between 1980 and 2018 for this
study.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the variables included in my
model. The independent variable of interest, red flag laws, is a dummy
variable coded 0 prior to the enactment of the law and 1 if the law went
into effect at any point during the year. The second and third columns of
Table 1 show the summary statistics of state-years separated according to
whether there was a red flag law in effect. The fourth column of Table 1
shows the outcome of a two-sided t-test on each red flag/no red flag pair,
indicating whether there is a statistically significant difference between
the means of the two groups. All rates are per 100,000 except for the
unemployment rate, which is per 100.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Red Flag
Law
11.77
5.09
18.68
12.94
6.87

No Red
Flag Law
13.57
5.39
21.97
14.73
11.31

t-test

Suicide rate
Female
Male
White
Nonwhite

Full
Sample
13.51
5.38
21.87
14.68
11.18

Firearm-related suicide rate
Female
Male
White
Nonwhite

7.63
1.94
13.49
8.50
4.83

5.09
1.15
9.15
5.66
2.48

7.71
1.97
13.62
8.59
4.90

***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***

Table continued on next page

example, ten white, seven Black, and six Asian people committed suicide, the data are missing for
both Black and Asian suicides. However, the data for the overall suicide count and for the white
suicide count are non-missing, so I am able to calculate the total nonwhite suicide count (2310=13). Underlying Cause of Death 1999–2018 on CDC WONDER Online Database Dataset
Documentation, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
https://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/help/ucd.html#
(last
visited
March
15,
2020),
[https://perma.cc/8P9A-VG2N]
90. CDC WONDER 1979–1998, supra note 3; CDC WONDER 1999-2019, supra note 3.
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Non-firearm-related suicide rate
Female
Male
White
Nonwhite

5.88
3.44
8.40
6.26
6.41

6.68
3.93
9.53
7.28
4.40

5.86
3.42
8.37
6.23
6.47

***
**
***
***
*

Homicide rate
Female
Male
White
Nonwhite

6.73
2.96
10.75
3.79
19.68

4.31
1.90
6.80
2.73
16.36

6.81
3.01
10.88
3.82
19.79

**
***
**
***
*

Firearm-related homicide rate
Female
Male
White
Nonwhite

4.58
1.53
8.14
2.31
14.16

2.95
0.91
5.06
1.56
13.38

4.64
1.55
8.24
2.34
14.18

**
***
**
***

Non-firearm-related homicide rate
Female
Male
White
Nonwhite

2.15
1.50
2.93
1.52
5.51

1.36
0.99
1.74
1.17
2.98

2.18
1.52
2.98
1.53
5.59

***
***
***
***
***

Red flag law

0.029

1

0

***

Unintentional poisoning death rate

8.30

13.34

8.15

***

Unintentional firearm death rate

0.26

0.09

0.26

**

Fraction white
Fraction black
Fraction another race

0.82
0.11
0.07

0.83
0.091
0.075

0.82
0.11
0.07

Fraction male age 45-64

0.11

0.13

0.11

Unemployment rate

5.54

5.73

5.54

Real per capita income ($)

58602.43

43941.10

***

Urbanization fraction

44369.6
7
0.71

0.88

0.70

***

Fraction married

0.42

0.41

0.42

N=
1471

N = 43

N = 1428

***

Note: Rates are per 100,000, except for the unemployment rate, which is per 100.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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The overall suicide rate and the suicide rate for each group except for
women is significantly lower in state-years with a red flag law than when
there is no red flag law. On average, the suicide rate is approximately
13% lower in state-years with a red flag law in place.91 Similarly, the
firearm-suicide rate is highly significantly lower for every group. The
overall firearm-suicide rate is about 34% lower on average when a red
flag law is in effect.92 The non-firearm related suicide rate is actually
higher in state-years with red flag laws for every group except nonwhite,
but the magnitude of the difference is smaller.93 Homicide rates—total,
firearm, and non-firearm—are all lower in state-years with red flag laws.
These differences are all statistically significant except for firearmrelated nonwhite homicide. While there are certainly more factors
causing these differences than the red flag laws alone, these raw numbers
motivate further investigation and support the idea that red flag laws may
deter firearm suicide, possibly with some substitution to non-firearm
suicide.
One methodological problem in the study of the relationship between
firearms and suicides and homicides is that it is difficult to accurately
measure the stock and change in the stock of firearms in the United States.
There is no mandatory registry of new gun purchases,94 and guns are a
durable good that can work for many years with minimal maintenance.95
Previous research on guns and crime, including homicide, has used the
percentage of suicides committed with a firearm as a proxy for gun
stock.96 Because suicide is one of the outcome measures of interest here,
91. 13.6 per 100,000 versus 11.8 per 100,000.
92. 7.7 per 100,000 versus 5.1 per 100,000.
93. The difference is about 0.82 per 100,000.
94. The National Tracing Registry, which systematically tracks the movement of firearms
recovered by law enforcement from their first sale by the manufacturer or importer through the
distribution chain to the first retail purchaser, exists, but the Tiahrt Amendment prevents the
National Tracing Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives from
releasing information from the firearms trace database to anyone other than a law enforcement
agency or prosecutor in connection with a criminal investigation. National Tracing Center,
BUREAU
OF
ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO,
FIREARMS,
&
EXPLOSIVES,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-tracing-center [https://perma.cc/M5HJ-BAAW] (June 15,
2020) (“The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) National Tracing Center
(NTC) is the United States’ only crime gun tracing facility.”). See Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3128-29 (2009) (preventing gun trace data from
being used in academic research of gun use in crime as well as use of any data released in civil
lawsuits against gun sellers or manufacturers); Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 70.
95. Cook & Braga, supra note 70, at 291 (“Since guns are highly durable commodities, used
guns appear to be a close substitute for new ones.”).
96. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 56, at 380 (using the percentage of suicides committed with
a gun as a proxy for gun prevalence to show that gun prevalence is possibility causally related with
gun homicide rates). See also Gary Kleck, Measures of Gun Ownership Levels for Macro-Level
Crime and Violence Research, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 13 (2004) (finding that the
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this approach is not a viable option for this study.97 Other studies have
used the results of surveys, number of gun magazine subscriptions,
number of background checks performed, and number of local gun shows
in a time period to proxy for gun ownership.98 My study will use the
unintentional firearm death rate to proxy for firearm availability.99 Other
studies have found this measure to be correlated with background check
and suicide measure.100 And, as an additional check, I am able to control
for the firearm suicide ratio in my homicide regressions and find virtually
no difference in estimates when controlling for unintentional firearm
death rate and firearm-related suicide death rate. Unintentional firearm
death measurement may be affected by local coroners’ standards for what
is an accidental death rather than a suicide or homicide.101 However, as
long as these judgment calls are not systematically related to red flag law
enactment, state and year fixed effects should resolve concerns with this
issue.102 As an extra check that unintentional firearm deaths are a valid
proxy for firearm stock and are not themselves directly affected by red
flag laws, I ran regressions replacing homicides and suicides with
unintentional firearm deaths as the outcome variable. I did not find any

percentages of suicides committed with guns is the best measure of gun ownership for crosssectional researched, but not for panel research); see also Deborah Azrael et al., State and Local
Prevalence of Firearms Ownership Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 43, 49 (2004) (finding that percentage of suicides committed with a gun is highly
correlated with survey-based estimates of gun ownership).
97. See Edwards et al., supra note 53, at 3120 (“[W]e are unable to use the firearm suicide ratio
since suicides is an outcome of interest.”); see also Lang, supra note 52, at 1087 (using firearm
background checks as a proxy for changes in firearm ownership rates to establish a positive causal
relationship between suicides and firearm ownership).
98. See, e.g., Briggs & Tabarrok, supra note 53, at 182 (using a composite measure of the
percentage of suicides committed with a gun, background check rates, and rates of accidental death
by gun, and showing that this correlates strongly with gun ownership estimates from the Behavioral
Risk Fact Surveillance Survey (BRFSS)); see also Lang, supra note 52, at 1087 (using firearm
background checks as a proxy for changes in firearm ownership rates); see also Duggan et al., supra
note 52, at 787–89 (examining the effect of local gun shows on homicide and suicide); see also
Duggan, supra note 55, at 1087 (arguing that subscriptions to a gun-related magazine are an
accurate way to measure gun ownership in an area).
99. See CDC WONDER 1979–1998, supra note 3; CDC WONDER 1999-2019, supra note 3
(providing unintentional firearm death rate by state by year). See also Edwards et al., supra note
53, at 3120 (demonstrating that this measure has become another popular proxy for firearm stock
in the gun violence literature).
100. See Edwards et al., supra note 53, at 3120 (using unintentional firearm death rates to proxy
for firearm availability and finding that accidental firearm death rates are correlated with firearm
background check data in a similar manner as firearm suicide rates).
101. Cook et al., supra note 70, at 1048.
102. See Edwards et al., supra note 53, at 3126 (arguing that because the enactments of laws
restricting and delaying gun purchases were independent of local coroners’ standards, variation in
the standards should not affect unintentional firearm death as a good proxy for gunstock).
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statistically significant results, which should lend confidence to the idea
that this is a reasonable control variable.103
I also control for other factors that may affect suicides and homicides.
These include state demographic and economic data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis and the Current Population Survey: per capita
income, unemployment rate, and the percentages of the white, black,
other race, metropolitan, and married population.104 I control for the
percentage of the population that is male between the ages of forty-five
and sixty-four because this is the group that accounts for the highest
number of suicides.105 I also include the unintentional poisoning death
rate by state and year as a proxy for alcoholism and prescription drug use
or abuse.106
B. Empirical Methodology: Difference-in-Differences
I use a quasi-natural experiment design and examine the difference-indifferences in homicide and suicide rates between states with and without
red flag laws across time. Social scientists have long used difference-indifferences analysis to approximate conditions similar to a laboratory
setting when running a traditional laboratory experiment is infeasible.107
Difference-in-differences first calculates the differences in suicide and
homicide rates in a treatment group before and after a policy goes into
effect, then compares that difference to a baseline difference in a control
group. We first find the difference in suicide rate in each state with a red
flag law before and after a red flag law was passed and take the average
across the states with red flag laws. We then do the same for states in
103. These results are available in Appendix Table A.2.
104. Sarah Flood et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey:
Version 6.0, MINNEAPOLIS, MN: INTEGRATED PUB. USE MICRODATA SERIES (IPUMS) (2018),
https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V6.0 [https://perma.cc/K5LF-2HF8] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020)
(IPUMS provides public access to cleaned and searchable Current Population Survey data, among
many other datasets); Annual Unemployment Rates by State, 1980–2018, IOWA CMTY. INDICATORS
PROGRAM: IOWA STATE UNIV., https://www.icip.iastate.edu/tables/employment/unemploymentstates (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (data from Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
105. See Suicide by Age, United States 2009-2018, SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR.,
https://www.sprc.org/scope/age [https://perma.cc/2MVZ-HTF2] (last visited July 20, 2020)
(illustrating that males between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four account for the highest number
of suicides).
106. See CDC WONDER 1979–1998, supra note 3; CDC WONDER 1999-2019, supra note 3
(providing unintentional poisoning death data).
107. See Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-Difference
Methods, 4 ECONOMETRICS 167 (2010) (providing a review of the literature on the use of
difference-in-differences in empirical studies); see also Elizabeth A. Stuart et al., Using Propensity
Scores in Difference-in-Differences Models to Estimate the Effects of a Policy Change, 4 HEALTH
SERVS. & OUTCOMES RSCH. METHODOLOGY 166, 166 (2014) (“Difference-in-difference (DD)
methods are a common strategy for evaluating the effects of policies or programs that are instituted
at a particular point in time, such as the implementation of a new law.”).
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which no red flag law was passed, subtracting before and after a red flag
law might have been passed. We then subtract, or difference, the
differences in these two groups from each other. This gives us the
difference-in-differences, which is a measure of the causal effect of red
flag laws on suicide (or homicide) rates. For the mathematically minded,
essentially what difference-in-differences does is calculate:
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑓𝑙

𝛽 = (𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑟𝑓𝑙

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑓𝑙

− 𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑟𝑓𝑙

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑙
(𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑟𝑓𝑙

−

)−

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑙
𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒−rfl
)

Equation 1
Red flag laws were enacted in response to high-profile mass shootings,
not to increases in firearm suicides or non-mass homicides, allowing me
to treat the enactment of these laws as exogenous to my outcome
variables, suicide and homicide rate. Exogeneity means that we can
establish a one-way causal relationship between red flag laws and suicide
or homicide rates, without worrying that any statistical relationship we
find might actually be the result of policymakers passing red flag laws in
response to increased suicide or homicide rates.108 Instead, we can
interpret the results of the difference-in-differences analysis below as
solely the causal effect of red flag laws on suicide or homicide rates.
Exogeneity is a standard assumption in regression analysis.
I employ a multiple-regression technique common for studies that
employ a difference-in-differences framework.109 Not only do
regressions allow me to estimate standard errors, but they also allow me
to include other measurable factors that may be influencing suicide and
homicide rates like income, unemployment, gender, and race.110

108. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS 561 (4th ed. 2009).
109. See, e.g., David Card & Alan Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772, 772 (1994)
(using difference-in-differences to measure the effect of the minimum wage on employment); see
also Edwards et al., supra note 53, at 3120 (using a difference-in-differences approach to exploit
within-state variation across time in both the existence and length of explicit firearm purchase wait
periods and delays created by licensing requirements); see also Alberto Abadie, Semiparametric
Difference-in-Differences Estimators, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 1 (2005) (“The difference-indifferences (DID) estimator is one of the most popular tools for applied research in economics to
evaluate the effects of public interventions and other treatments of interest on some relevant
outcome variables.”).
110. See Abadie, supra note 109, at 1 (“A good way to do econometrics is to look for good
natural experiments and use statistical methods that can tidy up the confounding factors that nature
has not controlled for us.”).
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Formally, I estimate:
ln(𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Equation 2
where ln(𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) is the natural log of the homicide or suicide rate in state 𝑖
at time 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable (coded as either 0 or 1) for the presence
of a red flag law, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of demographic and economic controls,
𝛾𝑡 are year fixed effects, 𝜏𝑖 are state fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error
term.111 This model allows for a more accurate measurement of the
relationship between red flag laws and suicide or homicide while
controlling for alternative explanatory variables.
C. The Effects of Red Flag Laws on Homicides and Suicides
The main results are reported below. Table 2 presents the results from
the difference-in-differences modeling for homicide rates, and Table 3
presents the results for suicide rates. The first panel of each table shows
the results for total homicides or suicides, the second panel shows the
results for firearm homicides or suicides, and the third panel shows the
results for non-firearm homicides or suicides. Each column in Tables 2
and 3 represents a unique regression, estimating first the outcomes for the
entire population, then separately the outcomes for the male, female,
white, and nonwhite population.112 In this sort of model, a positive
number indicates an increase in the rate of homicides or suicides and a
negative number indicates a decrease in the rate of homicides or suicides.
Three stars next to a number indicates that the result is significant at the
1% level, two stars indicates that it is significant at the 5% level, and one
star indicates that it is significant at the 10% level.113
111. I chose a log-linear model because I believe the impact of the policy will be proportional
to the base rate of homicide or suicide in each state-year. That is, it is likely that the policy has a
larger effect in an area or time when the rate of suicides or homicides is high, rather than a constant
marginal effect in all areas and time periods, like using rate dependent variables would assume.
112. The regression sample sizes differ because of suppression constraints on the data. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suppresses all state-level data representing zero to nine
deaths to protect privacy. Therefore, in state-years where, for example, six men and seven women
committed suicide, the data are missing for both male and female suicides. However, the data are
non-missing for the overall regression. There are more missing values for the homicide than for the
suicide data. Suicide results run on the homicide sample are available in Appendix A. The results
are qualitatively the same.
113. A result is statistically significant if the observed result would be unlikely if the null
hypothesis were true. A result being significant at, for example, the 1% significance level (i.e., at
the 99% confidence level), means that if the null hypothesis (i.e., there is no difference in suicide
rates between state-years with a red flag law and state-years without a red flag law) were true, we
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Table 2: Red Flag Laws on Homicides
(1)
All

(2)
Men

(3)
Women

(4)
White

(5)
Nonwhite

Total homicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

−0.018
(0.066)
0.899

−0.022
(0.072)
0.898

−0.0004
(0.052)
0.814

0.043
(0.068)
0.878

−0.079
(0.070)
0.621

Observations

1,353

1,345

1,345

1,328

1,328

Firearm homicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

−0.077
(0.092)
0.896

−0.069
(0.097)
0.893

−0.081
(0.069)
0.700

−0.002
(0.101)
0.896

−0.135
(0.098)
0.655

Observations

1,353

1,290

1,290

1,259

1,259

Non-firearm homicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

0.083**
(0.039)
0.788

0.100**
(0.049)
0.806

0.058
(0.048)
0.631

0.109**
(0.043)
0.728

-0.006
(0.069)
0.500

1,353
1,290
1,290
1,259
1,259
Observations
Notes. Each column represents a unique regression. Each observation is at the stateyear level. The dependent variable is the natural log of the various homicides rates,
and the standard errors are clustered at the state level. All specifications include state
and year fixed effects. The controls included in the columns are percent white,
percent black, percent male, unintentional poisoning death rate, unintentional
firearm death rate, percent age 45–64, percent male age 45–64, urbanization percent,
unemployment rate, real per capita income, and percent married. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

would expect to see the observed result (for example, a 3.7% decrease in suicides) only 1% of the
time. Statistical significance can never tell us for certain that there is no difference between two
data sets, but it can tell us how likely we would be to see the result we see if the data sets were the
same.
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Table 3: Red Flag Laws on Suicides
(1)
All

(2)
Men

(3)
Women

(4)
White

(5)
Nonwhite

Total suicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

−0.037***
(0.012)
0.951

−0.025**
(0.010)
0.948

−0.072***
(0.025)
0.874

−0.038***
(0.013)
0.945

−0.136**
(0.055)
0.435

Observations

1,471

1,471

1,471

1,468

1,468

Firearm
suicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

−0.064***
(0.021)
0.973

−0.050**
(0.019)
0.970

−0.175***
(0.050)
0.834

−0.070***
(0.020)
0.972

−0.087
(0.082)
0.441

Observations

1,471

1,469

1,469

1,450

1,450

Non-firearm
suicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

0.004
(0.014)
0.911

0.019
(0.013)
0.890

−0.028
(0.026)
0.836

0.005
(0.018)
0.893

−0.104
(0.063)
0.466

Observations

1,471

1,469

1,469

1,450

1,450

Notes. Each column represents a unique regression. Each observation is at the stateyear level. The dependent variable is the natural log of the various suicide rates, and
the standard errors are clustered at the state level. All specifications include state and
year fixed effects. The controls included in the columns are percent white, percent
black, percent male, unintentional poisoning death rate, unintentional firearm death
rate, percent age 45–64, percent male age 45–64, urbanization percent,
unemployment rate, real per capita income, and percent married. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

As is evident in Table 2, there appears to be no consistent statistically
significant relationship between red flag laws and total or firearm
homicides. This is true both overall and for each demographic group. This
result may be surprising to policy makers who enacted the laws in
response to high profile mass shootings, but it is not surprising given the
actual distribution of firearm deaths in the United States. Mass shootings
are rare; according to the Gun Violence Archive, about 378 people died
in U.S. mass shootings per year from 2013 through 2019, or about 0.12
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people per 100,000.114 Deaths from mass shootings comprise a tiny
fraction of the approximately 4.6 per 100,000 people killed every year in
firearm homicides.115 However, relatively speaking, firearm homicide
deaths overall are also rare. As shown in the Table 1 summary statistics
above, almost twice as many people are killed by firearm-related suicide
as by firearm-related homicide every year. It therefore seems logical that
red flag law enforcement efforts would be more concentrated on and
more successful at reducing firearm-related suicides than homicides.
Based on the limited information available about the practical
implementation and enforcement of red flag laws, it seems that these laws
are used most often to remove guns from individuals with apparent
suicidal, rather than homicidal, tendencies.116 Additionally, while red
flag laws can be used to remove a person’s guns and prevent them from
buying new guns, most criminal offenders report obtaining firearms
through secondary or illegal markets.117 This evidence suggests that even
if red flag laws are sometimes used to interrupt homicidal plans, they may
not have as much bite in secondary or illegal markets, which may explain
why there is no statistical difference in homicides or firearm homicides
associated with the implementation of a red flag law.
In contrast to the results in Table 2, Table 3 shows that red flag laws
do have a consistently negative and statistically significant effect on
firearm-related suicides. Specifically, I find that a red flag law decreases
firearm-related suicides by about 6.4% overall, with the biggest drop,
17.5%, for women. This gender difference could be because women have
the lowest base rates of firearm-suicide of any group analyzed, so
preventing even one suicide leads to a correspondingly larger percentage
change. One concern with policies that aim to prevent one method of
114. See sources cited supra note 1; see also Total Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=deaths&t=Populations%20and%20People&tid=ACSDT1Y
2019.B01003&hidePreview=false (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (averaging the total U.S. population
from 2013 through 2019 by using the dropdown menu at the top of the page).
115. See supra Table 1 (comparing homicide and suicide rates with and without red flag laws).
116. Parker, First Two Years, supra note 61, at 478 (“Firearm seizure by police was rarely a
result of psychosis; instead, risk of suicide was the leading reason.”); Parker, Indiana, supra note
59, at 308 (finding that in Indiana, removals were prompted by threatened or attempted suicide 68%
of the time, violence 21%, and psychosis 16%); Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 192
(finding that about 61% of gun removal requests in Connecticut cited concern about self-harm, 32%
cited risk of harm to others, and 9% cited both categories); Wintemute, supra note 61 (finding that
only 13% of removals in California involved an individual deemed at risk of perpetrating a mass
shooting).
117. Edwards et al., supra note 53, at 3133 (describing the impact of handgun purchase delay
policies on homicide and suicide outcomes); see also Cook et al., supra note 70, at 1047 (“[T]he
30 to 40 percent of all gun transfers that do not involve licensed dealers . . . accounts for most guns
used in crime.”); WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 70, at 4 (“[F]elons rarely obtain their guns from
legitimate retail outlets . . . .”); Cook & Braga, supra note 70, at 291–92 (discussing how stolen
guns form the source for a “vast” secondary market).
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suicide is substitution to other methods. That is, discouraging firearm
suicides may actually just encourage suicides by other means. To explore
this possibility, the bottom rows of Table 3 examine the effects of red flag
laws on non-firearm-related suicides. I find no evidence of a statistically
significant relationship between red flag laws and non-firearm-related
suicides. The effect on suicides overall is therefore a statistically
significant 3.7% decrease for all groups, consistent with studies
mentioned previously that find that the decision to attempt suicide can be,
for many potential victims, discouraged by small interruptions including
means restriction.118
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FIREARM POLICY
In this paper, I use variation in the timing of red flag laws and their
plausible exogeneity to homicide and suicide rates to estimate the effects
of red flag laws on firearm-related homicides and suicides. I find little to
no evidence of a relationship between red flag laws and homicides. This
result may be due to the avenues through which potential criminals obtain
firearms and the fact that homicides, despite their higher media visibility,
are actually much rarer than suicides. I do find, however, that red flag
laws reduce firearm-related suicides and suicides overall by about 6.4%
and 3.7%, respectively, with the drop in firearm suicide by group ranging
from 17.5% (women) to 5% (men). These results are both statistically and
substantively significant. They suggest that if all forty-five states without
a red flag law during this period were to adopt one, almost 1,300 lives per
year could be saved.119 About 38% of states currently have a red flag law,
and my results suggest that this increase in the adoption of red flag laws
is a lifesaving trend. My results add to a growing literature examining the
relationship between firearms and suicide and are congruent with the
findings of previous seminal studies as well as with previous red flag law
studies.120 My results are most similar to Kivisto and Phalen’s results for
Indiana and are higher than their Connecticut results and the results in
both Swanson papers.121 It is possible that the larger effects I find in my
118. See supra Section II.A (explaining that restricted access to means of suicide can effectively
prevent suicides without diverting them to another method of suicide).
119. This is based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation of 3.7% fewer suicides from the 1990
to 2018 average of 33,648 suicides per year, excluding states in the years they had red flag laws.
120. See, e.g., Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18 (exploring whether red flag laws in
Connecticut prevent suicide); Swanson Indiana, supra note 18 (measuring suicide outcomes since
Indiana passed a gun seizure law); Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 19 (comparing the changes in both
Connecticut and Indiana suicide rates between 1981 and 2015).
121. See Swanson Connecticut, supra note 18, at 203 (finding that Connecticut red flag laws
decreased firearm-related suicide by 6% and overall suicide by 2%); Swanson Indiana, supra note
18, at 193 (finding that Indiana red flag laws decreased firearm-related suicide by 0.57% and overall
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study may be partially due to the fact that I include Washington, Oregon,
and California in my analysis; the red flag laws in these three states are
more expansive in who they allow to petition for a removal order than
those laws in either Indiana or Connecticut, the two states studied by the
previous authors. The states that have passed red flag laws since 2018
also vary in the expansiveness of their laws.122 It is possible, and would
be consistent with economic theory,123 that as states expand the group of
people allowed to petition for an order, leveraging an expanded
information set, the accuracy and effectiveness of these laws increase.124
In addition, laws that allow ex parte orders may be more effective in timesensitive cases because the person subject to the order is likely to be
separated from their firearms more quickly.125 Red flag laws may also
suicide by 0.27%); Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 19, at 861 (finding that red flag laws contributed
to a 7.5% decrease in firearm suicides and a 3% decrease in overall suicides in Indiana, while
Connecticut laws resulted in a 1.6–13.7% decrease in firearm suicides which was completely offset
by an increase in non-firearm suicides, resulting in an overall slight increase in suicides); see also
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
122. See supra Part I (discussing state variation in red flag laws).
123. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 718–19 (Jack Repcheck ed.,
8th ed. 2010) (explaining how asymmetric information between buyers and sellers can cause
significant problems in a market).
124. Twelve states, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia, allow people
other than law enforcement to file a gun removal petition. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150 (2020);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-104 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7701, 7704 (2020) (family and
household members can petition for non-emergency orders); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-61
(2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35, 67/40 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-601(E)(2)
(West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131R (2020); 2019 NV A.B. 291; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:58-21 (West 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340, 6341 (MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 166.527 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.030(1) (2020). Maryland has gone the farthest,
allowing medical and mental health professionals, spouses and cohabitants, other family members,
co-parents, current dating partners, and current or former legal guardians to file petitions. See MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-601(E)(2) (West 2021).
125. Fourteen states, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the
District of Columbia allow removal of firearms from people subject to ex parte removal orders.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 18150(b) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-103 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 7703 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 790.401(4)(a) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-64
(2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/35 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 5-603 (West 2021);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131R, 131S, 131T (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-21, 23
(West 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340-6342 (MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.525,
166.527 (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054(a)(1) (2019);
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.050 (2020); D.C. CODE § 7-2510.04 (2020). Some states allow ex parte
removal only when the petitioner is law enforcement (Delaware, Florida, Rhode Island, and
Vermont) while others allow ex parte petitions by a larger group of petitioners (Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington). See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 7703 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 790.401(4)(a) (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-1 (2020); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054(a)(1) (2019) (allowing ex parte law enforcement only); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 134-61, 134-64 (2020); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/5, 67/35 (2019); MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-601(E)(2), 5-602, 5-603 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131R,
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decrease overall suicidality if they increase the probability that the person
subject to them receives mental health treatment, and states should
consider this connection to increase effectiveness as well.126 As states
gain more experience with these laws and mortality data become
available for years later than 2018, this may be an important area of future
research.
American politics faces historically high levels of polarization,
affecting nearly every institution of government.127 A key element of
depolarizing the normative debate about gun control and gun violence is
establishing a foundation of facts about gun control policies and gun
violence. From an economic perspective, firearms impart utility to gun
owners through recreational use and as a method of self-defense.
However, the availability of firearms also creates a negative externality
for society by increasing the probability that a firearm will be misused
for violence.128 Policies that aim to strike a balance between the costs
associated with restricting gun ownership and the negative externalities
associated with the improper use of firearms are likely welfare-enhancing
and are the most likely gun laws to be legislatively successful.129 I find
131S, 131T (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-21 (West 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340-6342
(MCKINNEY 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.525, 166.527 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.94.050 (2020) (permitting expanded ex parte).
126. Swanson Indiana, supra note 18, at 198 (finding that exposure to a red flag order also
increased the probability that a would-be suicide attempter received mental health treatment in the
year after the law was enacted).
127. The large literature on legislative polarization includes RED AND BLUE NATION?
CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS: VOLUME ONE (Pietro S.
Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006); RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES
OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS: VOLUME TWO (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds.,
2008); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); Gary C. Jacobson,
Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 688
(2013); BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL
POLICY MAKING (2006); POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Daniel J. Hopkins &
John Sides eds., 2015); SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily
ed., 2015); GOVERNING IN A POLARIZED AGE: ELECTIONS, PARTIES, AND POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (Alan S. Gerber & Eric Schickler eds., 2017); SAM ROSENFELD,
THE POLARIZERS: POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR PARTISAN ERA (2018). Polarization is highly
asymmetric, however, with Republicans having moved considerably further to the right than
Democrats have to the left. See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Confronting Asymmetric
Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed.,
2015); but see Bree Lang & Matthew Lang, Pandemics, Protests, and Firearms 15–18 (U.C.
Riverside,
Dep’t
of
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
202008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3593956 [https://perma.cc/7GWY-MWHD ]
(documenting that the large increase in firearm sales associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in
Republican states is statistically indistinguishable from the increase in Democrat states, indicating
that the divide between political parties may not be as wide as previously thought).
128. See supra Section II.A (discussing the connection between guns and violence).
129. Kelly Roskam & Vicka Chaplin, The Gun Violence Restraining Order: An Opportunity
for Common Ground in the Gun Violence Debates, 36 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1 (2017)
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that red flag laws can help mitigate some of the negative externalities of
gun ownership, specifically suicide. Red flag laws are targeted policies
which use individualized information to remove guns from the most atrisk individuals.130 Their targeted nature might minimize the costs of gun
control policies on responsible gun owners, while discouraging firearm
suicide without encouraging suicide by other means. Taken together, my
study and previous studies on this topic give strong support to the idea
that red flag laws are a successful means to prevent suicide and its
attendant costs on family, friends, community, and society at large.131
CONCLUSION
This Article exploits state-level variation across time in the existence
of red flag laws—gun control laws that permit police or family members
to petition a state court to order the temporary removal of firearms from
a person who may present a danger to others or themselves—to examine
their effect on homicides and suicides. The existence of a red flag law
reduces firearm-related suicides by 6.4% and overall suicides by 3.7%,
with no substitution to non-firearm suicides. Red flag laws are not
associated with statistically significant changes in homicides rates.
Policymakers should consider red flag laws an effective method to
prevent firearm-related suicide, one of the most deadly and prevalent
potential causes of death in the United States. In light of this evidence,
red flag laws should be more politically palatable than other forms of gun
legislation because of their targeted nature and potential to balance the
interests of gun owners against the negative externalities of gun
violence.132

(discussing how gun violence restraining orders address the intersection of gun violence, public
health, and mental health).
130. Vernick et al., supra note 45, at 100–01 (arguing that their targeted nature could make riskbased seizure laws effective).
131. See supra note 120 (listing relevant articles by Swanson, and Kivisto & Phalen on the
effects of red flag laws in Connecticut and Indiana).
132. Roskam & Chaplin, supra note 129 (describing how red flag laws are often passed in the
legislature in response to an avoidable public tragedy).
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APPENDIX
List A.1: Summary of pre-2018 Red Flag Laws133
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c (enacted 1999)
Who can petition? One state’s attorney or any two police officers
Maximum duration of order?
Ex parte: 14 days
Final: Up to one year
Requisite standard of proof?
Ex parte: Probable cause that (1) respondent poses an imminent risk,
(2) respondent owns firearms, and (3) firearms are in a specified
location
Final: Clear and convincing evidence that respondent poses a risk
Relinquishment process? Law enforcement searches areas named in the
warrant for firearms and ammunition and seizes them.
Early termination of order? No
Renewal? No
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-1, et seq. (enacted 2005)
Who can petition? Law enforcement
Maximum duration of order?
Emergency firearm removal: 14 days from submission of statement
Ex parte: 14 days
Final: Lasts until terminated by petition and a hearing, no earlier than
180 days after hearing for final order
Requisite standard of proof?
Emergency/Ex parte: Probable cause that respondent is dangerous
Final: Clear and convincing evidence that respondent is dangerous
Relinquishment process? Law enforcement searches areas named in the
warrant for firearms and ammunition and seizes them.
Early termination of order? Respondent may petition once every 180
days. If it has been less than one year since the order was originally
issued, respondent bears the burden of proving by preponderance of the
evidence that they are not dangerous. If it has been longer than one year
since the original order, the burden of proof falls to the state, which must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is still
dangerous.
Renewal? No
133. ERPO Procedures by State. GIFFORDS L. CENT., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/ERPO_Table_2-26-20.pdf (last updated Feb. 26, 2020).
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California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 18100, et seq. (enacted 2014)
Who can petition? Family, household members, employers, certain
coworkers and school staff, and law enforcement
Maximum duration of order?
Temporary: Up to 21 days
Ex parte: Up to 21 days
Final: One to five years
Requisite standard of proof?
Temporary: Reasonable cause to believe respondent poses immediate
and present danger.
Ex Parte: Substantial likelihood that respondent poses significant
danger in near future
Final: Clear and convincing evidence that respondent poses significant
danger
Relinquishment process? Firearms, ammunition, and magazines must
either be relinquished (1) immediately upon request of a law enforcement
officer, or (2) to law enforcement or transferred to a federally licensed
dealer within 24 hours. Respondent must file proof of relinquishment
with the court within 48 hours of being served.
Early termination of order? Respondent may petition once per year for
early termination. If no longer clear and convincing evidence to believe
that respondent meets the standard of dangerousness, the court shall
terminate the order.
Renewal? Final order can be renewed at any time within three months
before termination of initial order. Same standard as final order.
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.010, et seq. (enacted 2016)
Who can petition? Family, household members, and law enforcement
Maximum duration of order?
Ex parte: Up to 14 days
Final: Up to one year
Requisite standard of proof?
Ex Parte: Reasonable cause to believe respondent poses significant
danger of injury in near future
Final: Preponderance of the evidence that respondent poses significant
danger
Relinquishment process? Immediate surrender of firearms and concealed
pistol license to law enforcement. If order is not served by law
enforcement, surrender to law enforcement within 48 hours.
Early termination of order? Respondent may petition once during order’s
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duration for early termination. Respondent bears burden of proving by
preponderance of the evidence that they no longer pose significant risk of
danger.
Renewal? Final order can be renewed before termination of initial order.
Must be requested within 105 days before expiration, same burden of
proof as yearlong order.
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.525, et seq. (enacted 2017)
Who can petition? Family, household members, and law enforcement
Maximum duration of order?
Ex parte: If respondent requests hearing, must be held within 21 days.
Final: Up to one year
Requisite standard of proof?
Ex Parte: Clear and convincing evidence that respondent presents risk
in the near future
Final: Automatic if respondent does not request hearing after ex parte.
Same standard as ex parte
Relinquishment process? Surrender all “deadly weapons” to law
enforcement, gun dealer, or third party legally allowed to possess
firearms.
Early termination of order? Respondent may petition once during order’s
duration for early termination. Respondent bears burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that they no longer present risk.
Renewal? Final order can be renewed before termination of initial order.
Same standard and duration as final order.
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Table A.2: Red Flag Laws on Unintentional Firearm Homicides
(1)
All
Unintentional firearm deaths
Red flag law

−0.021
(0.040)

R-squared
0.705
Observations
1,471
Notes. Each observation is at the state-year level. The dependent variable is the
natural log of the various suicide rates, and the standard errors are clustered at the
state level. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. The controls
included in the model are percent white, percent black, percent male, unintentional
poisoning death rate, unintentional firearm death rate, percent age 45–64, percent
male age 45–64, urbanization percent, unemployment rate, real per capita income,
and percent married. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table A.3: Red Flag Laws on Suicides Using Homicide Sample
from Table 2.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

All

Men

Women

White

Nonwhite

Total suicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

−0.032***
(0.012)
0.953

−0.020**
(0.009)
0.952

−0.065**
(0.025)
0.881

−0.033**
(0.013)
0.949

−0.116**
(0.046)
0.496

Observations

1,353

1,353

1,353

1,350

1,350

Firearm
suicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

−0.057***
(0.019)
0.975

−0.043**
(0.017)
0.972

−0.156***
(0.043)
0.859

−0.061***
(0.017)
0.974

−0.078
(0.083)
0.487

Observations

1,344

1,342

1,342

1,324

1,324

Non-firearm
suicides
Red flag law
Standard error
R-squared

0.008
(0.015)
0.914

0.022*
(0.013)
0.895

−0.021
(0.027)
0.842

0.009
(0.019)
0.896

−0.071
(0.052)
0.507

Observations
1,344
1,342
1,342
1,324
1,324
Notes. Each column represents a unique regression. Each observation is at the stateyear level. The dependent variable is the is the natural log of the various suicide rates
and the standard errors are clustered at the state level. All specifications include state
and year fixed effects. The controls included in the columns are percent white,
percent black, percent male, unintentional poisoning death rate, unintentional
firearm death rate, percent age 45–64, percent male age 45–64, urbanization fraction,
unemployment rate, real per capita income, and percent married. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

